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COMMENTS 
MARITIME CONTIGUOUS ZONES 
This comment deals with problems involved when a coastal state asserts 
authority for special purposes over a zone of the sea outside its territorial 
waters.1 For two centuries it has been generally recognized that each nation 
has sovereignty over a belt of marginal sea, while the regime of freedom 
of the seas applies to the seas outside such territorial waters. Within its 
marginal sea belt, known as "territorial waters," a state has much the same 
rights as over its land territory, although foreign ships do have the rights 
of innocent passage and entry in distress, and even in port their internal 
affairs may to some extent escape the control of the shore state. There is, 
however, no agreement on the permissible breadth of territorial waters. 
Sweeping sixteenth and seventeenth century assertions of ownership of 
broad maritime areas had shrunk by 150 years ago,2 and many nations came 
to agree upon three nautical miles3 as the maximum breadth of territorial 
waters, although broader bands were claimed by various countries. In recent 
years, national claims to more than three miles of territorial waters have 
become widely prevalent; and no agreement was reached at either the 1930 
Hague Codification Conference4 or the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences 
on the Law of the Sea5 as to the breadth of territorial sea permitted under 
customary international law.6 
During the past two centuries, various states which had previously 
limited their claims of full sovereignty7 to narrow marginal seas have also 
asserted special types of jurisdiction over high seas zones outside what they 
1 On territorial waters, see generally BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 
481-549 (2d ed. 1962); 3 GmEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER (1934); JESSUP, 
TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927); Harvard Research in International 
Law, Territorial Waters, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. SPEC. Supp. 241 (1929). 
2 See FULTON, SoVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911); JESSUP, op. cit. supra note l; Kent, 
Historical Origin of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 537 (1954); Waldock, 
International Law and the New Maritime Claims, 1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 163 (1956); 
Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 1945 BRIT. Yn. INT'L L. 210. 
8 Unless otherwise specified, the "mile" referred to is the "nautical mile," which is 
approximately 1.15 "land miles" or "statute miles." It is fixed by different countries at 
distances between 1,852 and 1,855 meters, or approximately 6,080 feet. See BISHOP, op. cit, 
supra note 1, at 496. 
4 See GmEL, op. cit. supra note l; Reeves, Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters, 
24 AM. J. INT'L L. 486 (1930). 
IS See SORENSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA (lnt'l Conciliation Pamphlet No. 520, 1958); 
Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 607 (1958); Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, 8 INT'L 8: COMP. L.Q. 73 (1959); Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, 59 CoLUM. L. REv. 234 (1959); Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on 
the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1960), 
6 Predictably, however, there was general acquiescence in the earlier conclusion of 
the United Nations International Law Commission that claims to territorial waters in 
excess of twelve miles are not approved in international law. 
7 For a discussion of the elements and attributes of sovereignty, see HoHFELD, FUNDA• 
MENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REAsoNING 35-40 (1923). 
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claimed (or what others accepted) as territorial waters. This comment deals 
with such claims to contiguous zones of the high seas over which the littoral 
state asserts authority: which may affect the interests of other states.8 
As the width of the territorial sea narrowed, the importance of con-
tiguous zones increased. Nations like Great Britain and the United States 
found three miles too narrow a band for effective enforcement of customs 
laws. In the eighteenth century, Great Britain extended its competence for 
customs enforcement to one hundred leagues,9 and soon after independence 
the United States claimed four leagues for customs enforcement.10 
These early contiguous zones were acquiesced in when they appeared 
reasonable.11 On this basis, some modem writers have discussed contiguous 
zones in terms of a "rule of reason"12 or a theory of "interests,"18 both of 
which in essence consist of the proposition that if the littoral state has a 
legitimate interest the protection of which requires action outside its ter-
ritorial sea, and the contiguous zone asserted is reasonable, such action is 
not internationally illegal. However, acceptance of this proposition as 
having become a rule of international law, with no limit on the maximum 
distance from shore over which the zone may extend or specific limitations 
on the purposes for which it may be used, could open the door to uncon-
scionable proliferation of contiguous zones, with a resultant risk of jeop-
ardizing the freedom of the seas.14 
Although states have long asserted these special types of authority over 
high seas areas adjacent to their territorial waters, the use of the term 
"contiguous zones" to describe these areas is relatively recent.15 However 
s No international law question arises if the coastal state exerts authority within the 
zone solely against its own nationals. 
9 The "league" referred to is three nautical miles. See note 3 supra. 
10 See MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS (1929). See also JESSUP, op. cit. supra 
note I, at 75-86. 
11 Cf. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187 (1804), in which Mr. Chief Justice 
Marshall said of the seizure by Portuguese authorities of an American vessel hovering 
four or five leagues off the coast of Brazil (then Portuguese), that a nation's "power to 
secure itself from injury, may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory •••• 
Any attempt to violate the laws made to protect this right, is an injury to itself which it 
may prevent, and it has a right to use the means necessary for its prevention. These 
means do not appear to be limited within any certain marked boundaries, which remain 
the same at all times and in all situations. If they are such as unnecessarily to vex and 
harass foreign lawful commerce, foreign nations will resist their exercise. If they are 
such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from violation, they will be 
submitted to." Id. at 234-35. 
12 See HYDEMAN &: BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MARITIME ACTIVITIES 
237-39 (1960). 
13 See MASTERSON, op. cit. supra note IO, at 381. 
H Even enforcement of ordinary customs regulations may cause undue harassment. 
See Gm:EL, op. cit. supra note I, at 475; SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAw 
OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS 155 (1960) (hereinafter cited as 1960 OFFICIAL RECORDS] 
(remarks of the Yugoslav delegate). 
15 The term "contiguous zone" was that employed by the first and second United 
Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (Geneva 1958, 1960), as well as by the 
Conference for Codification of International Law (Hague, 1930). For earlier designations, 
see GmEL, op. cit. supra note 1, at 361 n.2 
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they. may be referred to in particular cases, the term "contiguous zone" has 
now generally come to be applied to those areas in which the littoral state 
exercises· limited competence for special purposes,16 as distinguished from 
the "territorial waters," over which it has sovereignty. Confusion in termi-
n.ology arises because in some cases national claims to so-called "contiguous 
zon~s" cover sea areas falling within what is claimed as territorial sea;17 
in such cases the assertion of limited competence would seem to be em-
braced within .the broader rights over the territorial sea, and this type of 
"contiguous zone" is not discussed in this comment.18 True contiguous 
z~nes, in which limited- competence is asserted for control of customs, sani-
tation, security, fishing, and other purposes, extend beyond the area subject 
to littoral sovereignty, and are claimed in one form or another by thirty-six 
states.19 
I. CURRENT STATE PRACTICE 
Each presently asserted contiguous zone has connected with it certain 
r~gulations. For example, the zone established by Canada for customs pur-
poses requires ships which have unloaded dutiable goods without official 
authorization to permit boarding and search. Violation of these regulations 
makes the ship liable to forfeiture, and if the ship refuses to stop and be 
16 See id. at 364; WIEBRINGHAUS, LA QUESTION DE LA ZONE CoNTIGUE DEVANT LA 
CONFERENCE DE GENEVE DE 1958 at 15 (1960); Harvard Research, supra note I, at 335. 
See also McDOUGAL 8: Burum, THE PUBUC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 610-11 (1962). 
17 Confusion in terminology occurs in regard to such instances as Chile, which 
claims a "territorial sea" of fifty kilometers, a "customs zone" of 100 kilometers, and 
asserts sovereignty over the water superjacent to its continental shelf for a distance of 
200 miles; and El Salvador, which asserts a territorial sea of 200 miles while apparently 
maintaining a security zone of twelve miles. 
18 Although a few states assert zones for civil or criminal jurisdiction, or with respect 
to neutrality (see authorities cited note 19 infra), this comment is further limited by 
confining discussion to security, fishing, immigration, sanitation, customs, and fiscal 
zones. Although "customs" and "fiscal" zones purport to describe different kinds of zones, 
the distinction is far from clear. 
19 A compilation of the various state claims with regard to adjacent sea areas was 
prepared by the United Nations legislative research staff in advance of the 1958 Geneva 
Conference and was brought up to date for the 1960 Conference. See 1960 OFFICIAL 
REcoIU>s 157-63. Similar studies may be found in FRANKLIN, U.S. NAVAL WAR CoLLEGE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SnmIES 1959-1960 at 275-87 (1961); Hooe, DIE GENFER SEERECHTSKON-
FERENZEN VON 1958 8: 1960 at 122-27 (1961). The following national claims accord with 
accepted principles: France asserts a territorial sea of three miles and a customs zone of 
twenty kilometers. Italy: territorial sea, six miles; security zone, ten miles. Colombia: 
territorial sea, six miles; fishing zone, twelve miles. Saudi Arabia: territorial sea, twelve 
miles; sanitary zone, eighteen miles. Ibid. A number of states, however, make unusual 
jurisdictional claims over marginal waters. Chile asserts a territorial sea of fifty kilometers, 
a customs zone of one hundred kilometers, and asserts sovereignty over the water 
superjacent to the continental shelf for a distance of two hundred miles from shore. 
Cambodia: territorial sea, six miles; security zone, twelve miles; sovereignty over the 
waters superjacent to the continental shelf out to a depth of fifty meters. Argentina: 
territorial sea, three miles; fishing and sanitary zones, ten and twelve miles respectively; 
sovereignty over the waters superjacent to the continental shelf. Costa Rica: territorial 
sea in accordance with international law; fishing zone, two hundred miles; and sovereignty 
over the waters extending two hundred miles from shore. Ibid. 
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searched, it may be fired upon.20 Regulations regarding security zones 
tend to be quite vague. Thus, an Iranian statute provides simply that in 
such zones the state will exercise a "droit de surveillance" to ensure the 
national security and defense.21 Fishery zones present a spectrum of severity 
in enforcement regulations, ranging from simple loss of license to fish in 
the particular waters22 to fines of up to three million dollars.28 United States 
regulations respecting oil pollution within its sanitary zone subject violators 
to fine or imprisonment or both, with the ship held as security for payment 
of the fine.24 
These zones exist and are generally obeyed, despite the fact that they 
have the practical effect of removing large and often critical areas from the 
realm of completely unfettered high seas. This is especially true when it is 
remembered that the traditional breadth of the territorial sea, and, indeed, 
the breadth that is still asserted by such major maritime powers as the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, is three miles.25 Further-
more, although nineteen states assert no specialized competence outside 
their territorial sea, they do claim territorial seas of twelve miles or more, 
resulting in a further lessening of the high seas area.26 In contrast, eleven 
states with territorial seas of only three miles have made no official provi-
sion for any contiguous zones.27 It is thus clear that there is no necessary 
relation between the width of the territorial sea and the establishment of 
contiguous zones. Some states with wide territorial seas set up specialized 
zones, while others with narrow territorial seas do not. Nevertheless, there 
appears to be a tendency for newly independent states and states with 
narrow territorial seas to do one of two things: either to establish specialized 
zones outside the territorial sea or to increase the width of the territorial sea 
itself. 
Although it has sometimes been argued that a littoral state may not 
validly enforce laws beyond the limits of its territorial waters unless such 
enforcement is directed against acts impinging on the littoral state's rights 
within its territorial sea, actual state practice effectively puts this argument 
to rest.28 As has been seen, a majority of the states asserting contiguous 
zones have laws directed solely at enforcing the rights claimed within t:4e 
zones, and, in general, the enforcement of such laws has been tolerateci.29 
20 UNITED NATIONS LEGISLATIVE SERIES, LAws AND REGULATIONS ON THE REGIME OF THE 
T.ERIUTORIAL SEA 96-97 (1957) [hereinafter cited at LEGISLATIVE SERIES]. 
21 LEGISLATIVE SERIES 24. 
22 LEGISLATIVE SERIES 462 (Costa Rica). 
28 See the discussion of the seizure of the Onassis whalers by Peru in BISHOP, op. cit. 
supra note 1, at 542. 
24 33 u.s.c. §§ 433-34 (1958). 
25 See the synoptical chart in 1960 OFFICIAL RECORDS ANNEXES AND FINAL Acr 157-63. 
26 See 1960 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 157-63; Hooe, op. cit. supra note 19, at 122-27. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE REsouRCES OF 
THE SEA 63-64 (2d ed. 1959). 
20 See McDoucAL &: B=, op. cit. supra note 16, at 623-25. 
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II. THE 1958 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 
In its report for 1956, the International Law Commission recommended 
that an international conference be held to draft a convention on the law 
of the sea.30 The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a reso-
·1ution embodying this recommendation, and the Conference convened in 
Geneva on February 24, 1958, eighty-eight states being represented.31 Five 
major committees were established, and the problems of the breadth of 
territorial seas and contiguous zones were assigned to the First Committee. 
Discussion of contiguous zones was based on Article 66 of a draft convention 
prepared by the International Law Commission: 
"I. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the 
coastal state may exercise the control necessary to 
"(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, or sanitary regula-
tions within its territory or territorial sea; 
"(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed 
within its territory or territorial sea. 
"2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from 
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."32 
Discussion in the First Committee revealed a difference of opinion as to 
whether territorial seas should be six or twelve miles wide. Since the word-
ing of the draft would make discussion of contiguous zones superfluous if 
the latter width were adopted, debate centered primarily on the question 
of the proper breadth of territorial seas. The discussion of contiguous zones 
tended to concentrate on two areas: (I) problems involving interpretation 
and clarification of the draft; (2) whether to include in the draft, zones 
other than those listed. 
A. Interpretation and Clarification 
Several states were troubled by the phrase "within its territory or ter-
ritorial sea" at the end of clauses l(a) and l(b) of the first paragraph of 
Article 66. It was feared that this might allow a state to take preventive 
or punitive measures only if some "infringement" actually occurred within 
its territorial sea.33 A situation might arise, for example, in which a ship 
30 INTERNATIONAL LA.w COMMISSION REPORT, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 11th Sess., 
Supp. No. 9 (A/3159) (1956) [hereinafter cited as 1956 REPORT]. 
31 7 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL REcORDS iii 
[hereinafter cited as 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs]. A number of specialized agencies and 
inter-governmental organizations were represented by observers. Ibid. 
32 1956 REPOltT 39. 
33 See 3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 13. Italy stated that it was essential to allow coastal 
states to take appropriate measures for infringement of its customs, fiscal, health, and 
immigration regulations, even if the regulations were violated, or the violation was 
discovered, in the contiguous zone itself. To insure that preventive action could be taken 
in the contiguous zone, Poland proposed replacing the first paragraph of the International 
Law Commission draft with this provision: "In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its 
territorial sea, the coastal State may take the measures necessary to prevent and punish 
infringements of its customs, fiscal or sanitary regulations, and violations of its security." 
Id. at 107,232. 
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was discharging atomic waste while in the contiguous zone of state X.84 
Assuming state X had forbidden such activities, it might be argued that 
at the moment of discharge X could take no preventive or punitive action 
because there was as yet no "infringement of its . . . regulations within 
its ... territorial sea."35 As was seen in the discussion of current state prac-
tice, such an interpretation is not consistent with actual practice. Although 
the First Committee adopted a draft which would have avoided these prob-
lems, 86 this version was rejected in plenary session, and the phrasing finally 
adopted was substantially identical to the International Law Commission 
draft on this point.s1 
Another interpretative problem was raised by the Peruvian delegate, 
who feared that Article 66 would be construed as an exclusive listing of 
permissible contiguous zones, and thus be incompatible with Peru's special 
fishing zone.88 Accordingly, he suggested that it be provided that Article 66 
was "without prejudice to the provisions of this convention concerning the 
other rights vested in the coastal state."39 This problem will be discussed 
below. 
Finally, to forestall disagreement concerning the boundaries of contig-
84 Nuclear maritime activities are covered in detail in HYDEMAN & BERMAN, op. cit. 
supra note 12, especially ch. 3. 
815 In both the International Law Commission draft and the draft adopted by the 
1958 Geneva Conference, there is a variation between the wording of § l(a) and that of 
§ l(b). The former speaks of preventing "infringement .•• within its territory," while 
the latter speaks of punishing "infringement . • . committed within its territory." 
(Emphasis added.) It could be argued that, since it is explicitly stated that punitive 
action may be taken only when infringements are committed within the territorial sea, 
the absence of such a limitation in § l(a) means that preventive action may be taken 
either in the territorial sea or the contiguous zone. However, § l(a), dealing with preven-
tion, is anticipatory in nature, and so it would be improper to speak of an infringement 
as being "committed"; after an infringement has occurred, i.e., has been committed, it 
can no longer be prevented. Consequently, omission of "committed" from § l(a) should 
not be taken to permit action under it which is forbidden under § l(b). 
so The draft adopted by the First Committee was as follows: 
"I. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal State may 
take the measures necessary to prevent and punish infringements of its customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary regulations, and violations of its security. 
"2, This contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
"3. The delimitation of this zone between two States the coasts of which are opposite 
each other at a distance less than the breadth of their contiguous zones, or between two 
adjacent States, is constituted, in the absence of an agreement, by the median line every 
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial seas of the two States is measured." 3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 
260-61. This draft was adopted by the First Committee by a vote of 50 to 18, with 8 
abstentions. Id. at 109. 
87 The phrasing used was that of the American proposal, which was adopted 60 to O, 
with 13 abstentions, after rejection of the draft of the First Committee by a vote of 
40 to 27, with 9 abstentions. 2 id. at 40. Decisions in plenary session require a majority 
of two-thirds of the 88 representatives present and voting. 2 id. at xxxiii. The invited 
observers had no right to vote. Id. at xxxii. 
88 Peru has asserted control over adjacent waters to a distance of two hundred miles. 
LEGISLATIVE SERIES 39. 
80 3 1958 OFFICIAL RECORDS 109. 
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uous zones of opposite and adjacent states, a third paragraph was added to 
Article 66: 
"3. Where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each 
other, neither of the two states is entitled, failing agreement between 
, them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median 
line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the 
base lines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of the two 
·. · states is measured."40 
B. Addition of Other Zones 
Most of the time spent debating contiguous zones was devoted to sug-
gestions for increasing the kinds of contiguous zones which would be 
allowed. A zone for the control of immigration was added without con-
troversy. Denmark proposed giving states jurisdiction in certain areas where 
they had assumed responsibility for safe navigation, but this proposal was 
not adopted.41 Zones for security and fishing control, although not in-
corporated into the final convention, were discussed at length. 
I. Security Zones 
States favoring a twelve-mile territorial sea asserted that such a width 
was necessary to provide adequately for the security42 and defense48 of 
littoral states. These states, and some which were not demanding such a 
wide territorial sea, wanted to include a "security zone" in Article 66.44 
Adherents of this proposal spoke in terms of both "security" and "defense," 
and some suggested a "defense zone" rather than a "security zone." It 
would ~eem that two distinct interests were being confused: (I) the desire 
of a state to be free from intimidation tactics, such as fleet manuevers off 
40 2 id. at 135. 
41 U.N. Doc. No. A/ CONF.13/5 at 32-33 (1958). 
42- E.g., the U.S.S.R. See 3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDS 31-32. 
43 E.g., Jordan. Although Jordan still officially maintains a three-mile limit, it 
supported a twelve-mile limit at the Conference. For a detailed table of national maritime 
claims and voting records at the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences, see Hooe, op. cit. 
supra note 19, at 122-27. 
44 E.g., Yemen (3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 16); Poland (id. at 38); Korea (id. at 44); 
Czechoslovakia (id. at 61); Philippines (id. at 107); Byelorussia (id. at 139). The Philippines 
recommended use of the term "defense" as less vague than "security." The International 
Law Commission had not included a security zone in its draft, maintaining: "the extreme 
vagueness of the term 'security' would open the way for abuses and ••. the gianting of 
such rights was not necessary. The enforcement of customs and sanitary regulations will 
be sufficient in most cases to safeguard the security of the State. In so far as measures of 
self-defence against an imminent and direct attack are concerned, the Commission refers 
to the general principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations." 
1956 REPORT 39-40. It is interesting to note, however, that the Commission did not think 
"security" too vague a term when, in Article 15, it stated that "Passage is innocent so 
long as a ship does not use the territorial sea for committing any acts prejudicial to the 
security of the coastal State. • •• " Id. at 19. Also, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea provides in Article 15, paragraph 4 that "Passage is innocent so long as it 
is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." 
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its coast,45 and (2) the desire of a state to be able to take forcible -action 
in its own defense. Despite the apparent validity of these national interests, 
however, the proposals for such zones were properly rejected. In an age 
of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles and Polaris submarines, it is 
debatable whether a twelve-mile zone would provide a state any real 
security.46 Furthermore, customary international law appears to recognize 
a right of innocent passage for warships through the territorial sea in 
times of peace. Arguably, this is also true under the provisions of the 
1958 Geneva Convention.47 If such a right exists in territorial seas, where 
the littoral state possesses sovereignty, a fortiori there could be no inter-
ference with such innocent passage in contiguous zones. Although this right 
of innocent passage obtains only in times of peace, if war or hostilities were 
imminent, regulations limiting passage would probably be disregarded. 
Even admitting that a special zone for security might be militarily 
justifiable, it would nevertheless seem inappropriate to subsume it under 
the heading of "contiguous zones." Prior to the establishment of the United 
Nations, international law apparently allowed a state to take preventive 
action outside its own territory only in the case of "an instant and over-
whelming necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment of deliberation."48 The United Nations Charter preserves "the 
inherent right of . • . self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations,"49 but it also provides that "all Members 
shall ... refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."50 This would seem 
45 Outside of vague references to former colonial powers, this desire was not made 
explicit in the 1958 Conference. However, in the 1960 Conference the delegate from 
Iran stated: "[T]he tragic memory of the appearance of warships in the coastal sea, 
threatening all liberation movements in this nation, will not be obliterated so easily. 
At a distance of six miles warships would still be visible and thus distance would not 
afford to this nation a guarantee conducive to a feeling of security. These anxieties and 
fears might seem exaggerated to the great maritime powers; however, it is a question of a 
psychological element ••• ," 1960 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 317. This apprehension does not 
appear to be entirely without basis. See FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 123, where 
it is pointed out that at a distance of twelve miles the identification and even sighting 
of ships becomes difficult, and that it would therefore be desirable for the United States 
to campaign for a narrow territorial sea. 
46 This point seems to have been recognized by Ceylon. 1960 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 285. 
Furthermore, certain military reasons were among the considerations prompting the 
United States to advocate restricting the competence of littoral states. See FRANKLIN, 
op. cit. supra note 19, at 120-26. 
47 See id, at 121. Paragraph one of Article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea provides that "ships of all States shall enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea." 3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 210. This right is somewhat 
qualified by paragraph four, which defines "innocent" as "not prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State," but in theory, at least, the right of innocent 
passage exists. 
48 See 'Webster's note regarding the Caroline affair in 2 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 
409-14 (1906), and the discussion in BISHOP, op. cit, supra note I, at 776-79. 
40 U.N. CHARTER art, 51. 
50 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
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to limit even further any right to take preventive or punitive action in 
self-defense.51 In short, if there is actual or imminent attack, a right of 
self-defense exists independent of any special zone;52 where the right does 
not exist, there is no "defense" or "security" justification for establishing 
contiguous zones which might impede free navigation. 
2. Fishing Zones 
The 1958 Geneva Conference devoted even more discussion to contiguous 
fishing zones. Economic arguments predominated,53 but some political 
overtones were also present.54 Underdeveloped countries argued that it was 
economically necessary for them to control fishing up to twelve miles from 
their coasts, and some states claimed even more extensive areas.55 A few 
economically advanced states also sought control of offshore fisheries.56 
Despite considerable support, however, contiguous fishing zones were re-
jected,57 and this decision seems correct. Asserting control over fishing 
activities amounts to claiming authority akin to sovereignty, for such con-
trol involves, in effect, the enforcement of property rights of the littoral 
state.58 Conventional contiguous zones are designed to exclude prohibited 
51 This point is not of great weight, but it illustrates the argumentative difficulties 
confronting such zones. And certainly there is a distinction with regard to the potentiality 
of armed clashes, between enforcing regulations against unarmed merchants, and against 
warships. 
52 This appears to be the view of the International Law Commission. See MURCHISON, 
THE CONTIGUOUS Am SPACE ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 46-47 (1956). 
53 See, e.g., comments by the Canadian delegate, 3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 52; by the 
Viet-Namese delegate, id. at 53; by the Irish delegate, id. at 56; and by the Ecuadorian 
delegate, id. at 62. An exhaustive report, The Economic Importance of the Sea Fisheries 
in Different Countries, appears in I id. at 245. 
54 The underdeveloped and newly independent states were particularly vocal in 
denouncing any provisions which might tend to restrict the authority of a littoral state. 
The Saudi Arabian delegate stated that "the newly independent States were determined 
to take part in the codification of the law of the sea, but they were equally determined 
not to renounce their vital interests . . • . The Committee should not allow itself to 
be influenced by any outmoded rules of international law which were based on the 
custom and usage of one or two States only." 3 1958 OFFICIAL RECORDS 3. The U.S.S.R. 
favored expanding the authority of shore states, since this furthered "its policy of helping 
small and economically less advanced countries to develop their national economies and 
improve their standards of living." Id. at 32. 
55 E.g., Ceylon, 100 miles; Costa Rica, 200 miles; El Salvador, 200 miles. See the 
synoptical table listing various state claims in FRANKLIN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 275. 
56 Canada was in the forefront of these. See the Canadian comments on Article 66 
of the International Law Commission draft in the preparatory work of the 1958 Con-
ference, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/5 at 6-7 (1958). 
57 The First Committee adopted, 37 to 35, with 9 abstentions, a Canadian proposal 
to the effect that there existed a twelve mile contiguous zone in which the littoral state 
"has the same rights in respect of fishing and the exploitation of the living resources of 
the sea as it has in its territorial sea." 3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 176-77. However, this 
proposal was later rejected in plenary session 35 to 30, with 20 abstentions. Id. at 39. 
58 "[Sovereignty] is considered to be closely related to ownership in private law •.•• 
Whatever rights, privileges, powers and immunities the law attaches to the owner, those 
are enjoyed by that nation which is sovereign of the object. In this sense it is believed 
that a State is sovereign over the territorial sea and over the air space." JESSUP, TERRITORIAL 
WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 116-17 (1927). See also, VERDROSS, VoLKERRECHT 215 
(1960). 
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items from the territory of the littoral state or its adjacent waters; they are 
aimed at preventing use of the sea which is potentially dangerous to the 
littoral state.ri9 Fishing, however, does not introduce anything harmful into 
a state's territory; to the contrary, something valuable is removed from the 
sea. Removal of fish would give a littoral state legal cause for complaint 
only if it had sovereignty over the area in question. 
The distinction between immigration and emigration is a useful analogy 
here. The International Law Commission draft makes no mention of the 
latter, because emigration must occur from the area, sea or land, subject 
to the sovereignty of the littoral state. Immigration, however, originates 
outside the area of sovereignty; it involves introducing people into the 
littoral state via the sea; hence, it is a proper object for control through 
special zones. 60 
C. The 1958 Geneva Convention Draft 
The article concerning contiguous zones, as ultimately approved by the 
1958 Geneva Convention, read as follows: 
"I. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the 
coastal state may exercise the control necessary to: 
"(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or 
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea; 
"(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within 
its territory or territorial sea. 
"2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from 
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
"3. Where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each 
other, neither of the two states is entitled, failing agreement between • 
them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median 
line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on 
the base lines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of the two 
states is measured."61 
Several interpretative and policy questions are raised by this draft. One 
ambiguity was discussed earlier, namely, whether preventive and punitive 
measures are authorized only with respect to infringements occurring within 
the territorial sea, or whether such measures may also be taken with respect 
to infringements occurring within the contiguous zone itself. The language 
in plenary session was identical to that in the International Law Com-
mission's report, except for the addition of the overlapping zones provision. 
50 "Conventional contiguous zones" refers to, e.g., customs, fiscal, and sanitary zones, 
and after the Geneva Conference, immigration zones. 
60 The table in 1960 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 157-63 lists claims to the continental shelf, 
along with special regulations concerning customs, security, fishing, neutrality, sanitation, 
and criminal or civil jurisdiction, but apparently the compilers could find no immigration 
regulations. In the 1958 Conference the Philippine delegate urged the inclusion of 
"immigration" in the draft because of the peculiar problems faced by an island state 
in controlling it. 3 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 107. 
61 2 1958 OFFICIAL RECORDS 135. 
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It will be recalled that the First Committee's draft avoided this ambiguity 
by providing that "in a zone .•. contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal 
state may take the measures necessary to prevent and punish infringements" 
of its regulations,62 but this draft was rejected in the plenary session. The 
reversion to the International Law Commission's draft could be cited for 
divergent conclusions. Those in favor of permitting littoral states to take 
punitive and preventive action against infringements occurring within 
contiguous zones could say that, since a majority of the participants in 
the Conference voted in the First Committee to give littoral states such 
authority, the rejection of the First Committee's draft should be taken to 
·mean merely that the plenary session felt that such authority was implicit 
in the International Law Commission's draft. The rejection of the First 
Committee's draft could be ascribed to its inclusion of a security zone, 
the propriety of which was much more in dispute than were enforcement 
measures. On the other hand, those desiring to restrict the authority of 
littoral states to the prevention or punishment of infringements occurring 
within the territorial sea would maintain that the plenary session meant 
to adopt the restrictive interpretation which flows from the literal meaning 
of the words. 
Such speculations assume, however, that an international tribunal would 
look to the debates preceding adoption of the convention. This is by no 
means certain. As the Permanent Court of International Justice has stated, 
"there is no occasion to have regard to preparatory work if the text of a 
convention is sufficiently clear in itself."63 On the other hand, some author-
ities indicate that more liberal resort is to be made to pre-enactment 
materials when construing an international convention than when a do-
mestic statute is involved.64 If pre-enactment materials are consulted, it 
must be admitted that, despite the arguments on both sides, such materials 
favor the restrictive interpretation. It seems difficult to overcome the fact 
that the plenary session rejected express attempts by the First Committee 
to allow enforcement for infringement of contiguous zones. Nevertheless, a 
contiguous zone would be of little value if preventive or punitive action 
could not be taken in it. For this reason any decision on the matter should 
62 Speaking of this draft, the Polish delegate who proposed it said that the "text did 
not limit the coastal State's rights to the prevention and punishment of infringements of 
regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea. The purpose was to cover 
such infringements committed within the contiguous zone itself." 3 1958 OFFICIAL 
RECORDS 107. 
63 Interpretation of the 1919 Convention concerning the Employment of Women at 
Night, P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 50 (1938). 
64 Although in interpreting the Convention, supra note 62, the majority of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice stated that there was no need to resort to 
preparatory work if the convention's terms were clear, it nonetheless went on to examine 
preparatory material, excusing departure from the rule because of "confident opinions 
expressed by several delegates with expert knowledge of the subject" who were present 
at the adoption of the convention. See BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 
171-72 and authorities there cited; Lauterpacht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work 
in the Interpretation of Treaties, 48 H,uw. L. REv. 549 (1935). 
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hold such action permissible.611 The possibility of such a controversy arising 
could have been prevented had the drafters made their meaning more ex-
plicit by providing, for example, that a state might exercise the control 
necessary to "prevent infringement within its territorial sea, territory or 
contiguous zone" and that a state might punish such infringements if 
committed.66 If this were done, a ship releasing nuclear contaminants 
within a contiguous sanitary zone would clearly be subject to both pre-
ventive and punitive action. Allowing the littoral state this power would 
be more in harmony with present-day state practice than would be the 
contrary result.67 
Another problem arises because, as the Convention draft now stands, 
it is arguable that a littoral state could apply its regulations to vessels 
passing laterally through a contiguous zone with no intention of entering 
the internal waters or even the territorial sea of the state. Other articles 
of the Convention providing for certain specialized jurisdictional rights 
for the littoral state draw a distinction between actions which may be 
taken against a ship proceeding to or from internal waters and those simply 
passing laterally through the area.68 No such distinction is intimated in 
contiguous zone provisions, apparently indicating that contiguous zone 
regulations may be indiscriminately applied.69 Although the regulation of 
611 Arthur Dean, chief of the United States delegation, believes that, under paragraph 
l(a) of Article 24, the littoral state can at least "adopt laws prohibiting activity in the 
contiguous zone the effect of which involved an infringement of the .•• territory of the 
state." Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 
52 AM. J. lNT'L L. 607, 624 (1958). He doubts, however, the right of a littoral state to 
take punitive action with regard to infractions of its regulations. Id. at 624. For a view 
of paragraph l(a) contrary to that of Mr. Dean, see McDoucAL &: BURKE, op. dt. supra 
note 16, at 620-21. 
66 If the drafters actually intended the contrary result, they should have inserted 
another paragraph to the effect that prevention or punitive actions may not be taken in 
the contiguous zones. 
117 See text accompanying notes 28, 29 supra. Curiously, however, the phrasing of the 
introduction to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and The Contiguous Zone lends 
credence to the postulate that state practice contemporaneous with the 1958 Conference 
was not the same as the standards set up in the Convention. The introduction simply 
states that the Convention parties "Have agreed as follows." 2 1958 OFFICIAL REcoRDS 
lll2. This is in contrast to the Convention on the High Seas, the introduction to which 
states that the parties "desiring to codify the rules of international law relating to the 
high seas, Recognizing that the United Nations Conference • • • adopted the following 
provisions as generally declaratory of established principles of international law, Have 
agreed as follows." Id. at 135. Apparently the former convention was thought not to be 
declaratory of existing practice. 
68 See, e.g., Article 16, paragraph 2: "In case of ships proceeding to internal waters, 
the coastal State shall also have the right .... " 3 id. at 134; Article 19, paragraph 2: 
"The above provisions do not affect the right of the coastal State to take any step 
authorized by its laws ••• on board a foreigu ship passing through the territorial sea 
after leaving internal waters." Id. at 134. 
60 A somewhat analogous problem has arisen in connection with Air Defense Identifi-
cation Zones. These are areas extending several hundred miles off the coast of the United 
States and Canada. All aircraft entering these zones are required to identify themselves to 
shore stations, so that potentially hostile aircraft may be detected. The United States 
requires only in-bound aircraft to identify themselves, but Canada r~quires identification 
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lateral traffic could interfere with free navigation, power to make such 
regulations is probably necessary if a contiguous zone is to fulfill its func-
tion. In the case of a sanitary zone, a ship passing parallel to the shore 
could as easily pollute the water as a ship heading into or out from ter-
ritorial or internal waters. Even though customs, fiscal, and immigration 
control do not at first appear to require control of lateral traffic, a ship 
moving laterally can, if the ingenuity and expertness are available, trans-
ship prohibited articles for delivery to shore. It might have been desirable, 
however, for the Convention to have provided that vessels merely passing 
parallel to the shore could be interfered with only if there is an obvious 
danger of infringing coastal regulations.7° Such a provision would allow 
the littoral state to protect its vital interests while at the same time granting 
a partial immunity to lateral traffic. Regardless of how this problem is re-
solved, some clarification of the status of laterally traversing vessels is 
needed. 
Another impediment to the authorizing of contiguous zones by inter-
national convention was especially prevalent at the Hague Convention in 
1930. It was feared that international approval of such zones might induce 
some states to extend the boundaries of their territorial waters to encom-
pass the permissible area for contiguous zones.71 If contiguous zones were 
permitted up to twelve miles from shore, it would not be as great a depar-
ture from past practice for a state to claim sovereignty over that entire 
area as it would be if there were, for instance, territorial seas of only three 
miles and no contiguous zones. A state claiming such increased rights could 
better rationalize its aggrandizement if it had already been operating juris-
dictionally in the area.72 This fear does not appear to be entirely without 
justification. Bulgaria, for example, has engaged in an analogous practice. 
When it proclaimed that its "territorial sea" extended twelve miles from 
shore, it at the same time established a distinct "maritime frontier zone," 
extending three miles from shore. Although the "territorial sea" is regu-
by all aircraft, even those travelling laterally through the zone. As yet no objection has 
been raised to the Canadian practice. See generally MURCHISON, op. cit. supra note 52. 
70 Admittedly, such a provision would be primarily exhortatory. However, its inclusion 
in an international agreement would give it a certain moral force which might help 
restrain overly zealous states. 
71 CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW REPORT OF THE SECOND 
CoMJIUITEE 13 (1930) (Territorial Sea). 
72 For instance, the Iranian delegate to the Second Geneva Conference stated that 
although Iran had maintained a territorial sea of six miles and a contiguous zone of 
six miles since 1934, in 1959 it had, for reasons of security, extended its control and 
united the two parts into a territorial sea of twelve miles. 1960 OFFICIAL REcoRDs 316. 
It would be of particular argumentative value to states seeking to extend their territorial 
waters if zones such as fishing and security were internationally approved. Establishment 
and enforcement of these zones involves the exercise of certain sovereign attributes, and 
classifying them as contiguous zones would enable a state to argue that there is little 
difference between exercising a certain species of sovereignty in an area, and exercising 
complete sovereignty therein. 
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lated extensively, foreign ships are permitted to "pass through or stop or 
anchor" in it, a right not accorded them in the "maritime frontier zone."73 
By being able to point to a limited three-mile zone in which its regulation 
is more severe, Bulgaria can thus purport to justify assertion of sovereignty 
over a twelve-mile zone. Similar arguments could be made by a state claim-
ing a territorial sea wider than six miles but narrower than its contiguous 
zone.74 
It has been argued that assuring littoral states some competence to act 
beyond their territorial waters, by establishing contiguous zones through 
international convention, serves to remove the pressure on littoral states to 
widen their territorial seas. Even before the Geneva Conference, however, 
there seems to have been a fairly general acquiescence in the validity of the 
type of zones authorized by Article 24.75 Yet this fact did not prevent a 
number of states from extending their territorial seas. Indeed, it might be 
argued that specific enumeration of protectible interests in Article 24 will 
tend to make extension of territorial seas more likely than before, for if 
such enumeration is taken to be exclusive, a state feeling a need to extend 
its competence to protect an unlisted interest will have no alternative but 
to do so by an extension of its territorial sea. 
Article 24 of the territorial sea convention fixes twelve miles as the 
maximum width of the contiguous zone. Fixing such a single maximum 
width has eminent support,76 but also weighty opposition.77 If uniformity 
for uniformity's sake is a virtue, then Article 24 is praiseworthy. Yet the 
price of uniformity is loss of flexibility, and in the case of the contiguous 
zones it is particularly questionable whether the gain in uniformity is 
worth the price. As circumstances change, it may be necessary to alter the 
width of a contiguous zone dealing with a single matter; it seems highly 
unlikely that twelve miles will prove sufficient for all contiguous zones. 
Even though Article 24 would permit variation in the width of contiguous 
zones actually claimed, such variation must occur within twelve miles; 
certain sovereign interests may demand extension beyond that limit. An 
alternative to placing a maximum limit on width would be to permit 
73 Decree of 10 October 1951 in LEGISLATIVE SERIES 80-81. 
74 The possibility of such a contention is not entirely speculative. Saudi Arabia, 
for instance, now claims a territorial sea of twelve miles, and contiguous zones for 
customs, security, and sanitation of eighteen miles. FRANKLIN, U.S. NAVAL ·wAR COLLEGE 
1959-1960 at 284 (1961). 
71i See text accompanying notes 28, 29 supra. 
76 Gide! felt that the maximum width of the contiguous zone should be twelve miles, 
and therefore criticized the work of the Harvard researchers. 3 GmEL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
Punuc DE LA MER 480 (1934). 
77 See, e.g., MASTERSON, JURISDICTION IN MARGINAL SEAS xiv (1929): "The attempt 
within recent years, on the part of some writers, judges, and governments, to fix a single 
zone beyond which the application or enforcement of [contiguous zone regulations] is 
forbidden, thus treating them as a single problem, has cast this extremely difficult subject 
into hopeless confusion, and has littered the juristic literature on the subject with 
careless assertion." See also VISSER 'T HooFT, LEs NATIONS UNIES ET LA CONSERVATION DES 
REsOURCES DE LA MER 99 (1958). 
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extension beyond twelve miles if a littoral state could make a strong show-
ing that effective protection of its customs, fiscal, sanitary, or immigration 
interests required a contiguous zone wider than twelve miles and that only 
reasonable steps would be taken to provide protection. If these conditions 
were met, a littoral state should be allowed to extend its competence to 
the extent necessary to accomplish its purpose. To prevent such a scheme 
from degenerating into a mere carte blanche for widespread assertions 
of competence, however, some sort of appeal machinery would have to be 
provided. The idea of an international committee of experts to settle such 
disputes is not without precedent,78 and the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas made provision for 
such a commission.79 A committee of maritime experts, established to over-
see contiguous zones, could consider the needs of the littoral state seeking 
to extend its zone, the reasonableness of the proposed regulations, and the 
probable impact of the regulations on high-seas navigation. States which 
feel that they would be unduly hampered by the regulations would be 
charged with initiating appeal to the committee. Through use of such an 
international commission, states would not only be guaranteed free exercise 
of competence within the first twelve miles, but would also have open to 
them an avenue for lawfully extending their control when necessary. 
A draft convention incorporating this proposal for an international 
appeal commission would probably attract substantial support. Since it 
would not deal with fishing and security rights, it would not be repugnant 
to the Latin American or Soviet blocs. Maritime powers should be willing 
to accept it, for the commission would not approve extensions of compe-
tence which would unreasonably infringe freedom of the seas. To nations 
78 At its 1934 Paris session, the Institut de Droit International recommended the 
adoption of a convention establishing a permanent maritime committee. According to 
its draft, a special committee composed of persons particularly versed in international 
maritime law would act as a conciliation commission in case of differences among members 
of the organization. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, PREP. Doc. No. A/CONF. 
13/21 at 91 (1958). The International Law Association at its 1924 Stockholm meeting 
advanced a somewhat more ambitious scheme. Id. at 103-11. Its purpose, according to 
Article 1, was to facilitate freedom of communication and of maritime commerce, while 
safeguarding the national interests of the littoral states. Article 3 set up an international 
commission to ensure that the convention regulations were observed and to prevent or 
peaceably resolve disputes between states with regard to the routes of maritime commerce. 
Article 30 lists the various powers of the commission, among which were to watch over 
and keep complete freedom of navigation, conformable to the convention, and to adopt 
whatever means might prove necessary to ensure that end. Article 31 then supplies the 
commission with sanctions, including the power to fine states violating commission 
regulations, and to close the ports of the violator to shipping, and also to close the ports 
of other states to the shipping of the violator. 
79 Article 9 provides for a commission of five members, to be selected by mutual 
agreement of the states involved. Article 11 provides that the decisions of the commission 
shall be binding, and makes the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article 94 of the U.N. 
Charter applicable to such decisions. 2 1958 OFFICIAL RECORDS 139. That Article of the 
Charter gives recourse to the Security Council in case a state should not accept the 
judicial determinations. A like recourse could be established in the case of the proposed 
commission, if its determinations were not followed. 
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jealous of their sovereignty, it would provide a possible means for expansion 
of, rather than restriction upon, their powers. 
III. THE 1960 GENEVA CONFERENCE 
The 1960 Geneva Conference was convened because of the inability of 
the 1958 Conference to agree on the width of territorial waters.80 Some 
discussion on contiguous zones for fishing was also planned.81 The argu-
ments advanced were repetitious of those presented at the 1958 Conference, 
and it would serve little purpose to examine them.82 It is interesting to 
note, however, that proposals for a wider territorial sea received fewer votes 
in 1960 than in 1958, while the proposal of a six-mile territorial sea coupled 
with a six-mile contiguous zone giving the littoral state special fishing rights 
received more votes in 1960 than had a similar proposal in 1958.83 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Geneva Conferences removed any reasonable doubt concerning the 
validity of customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary zones, so long as they 
do not extend more than twelve miles from shore. Actually, however, there 
was little doubt regarding the validity of such zones before the Conferences. 
Many states had already regulated such matters in areas beyond their territo-
rial seas. With regard to these states, Article 24 of the Convention on the High 
Seas and Contiguous Zones is, in a sense, a step back.ward, for it imposes 
a single maximum limit of twelve miles on diverse interests, and also makes 
it doubtful whether littoral states can take preventive and punitive action 
in contiguous zones. For these reasons, the effect that the Convention will 
have on states that ratify it is speculative.84 It is difficult to believe that such 
a state would forbear from taking measures against a ship hovering out-
side its territorial sea, but within twelve miles of the shore, when that ship 
is unloading contraband for carriage to the shore, or even that it would 
forbear from acting against such a ship if it were just beyond twelve miles. 
Under the Convention, however, the former arguably and the latter cer-
tainly would be forbidden. The Convention can, of course, be expected 
to have even less effect on states that have not ratified it. 
In addition to limiting the width of contiguous zones to twelve miles, 
the Convention limited the subjects amenable to contiguous zone treat-
80 Id. at 113. 
81 Id. at 77, 113. 
82 See McDOUGAL &: BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 544-45 (1962). 
83 The 1960 Conference is discussed in Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the 
Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. lNT'L L. 751 (1960). Voting 
patterns are also compared. Id. at 782-85. 
8~ According to U.N. Doc. No. ST/LEG/3, rev. 1, eighteen states had ratified or 
acceded to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone as of 
December 31, 1962. Article 29 of the Convention provides that it will come into force 
thirty days after deposit of the twenty-second ratification or accession with the Secretary-
Gencral. 
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ment to four: customs, fiscal matters, sanitation, and immigration. This 
circumscription of subject matter, while limiting the flexibility of the pro-
vision, is not entirely without merit. It at least assures states of the validity 
of zones established for these limited purposes, and though fishing rights 
and security interests are of great importance, their exclusion from the draft 
was wise. Fishing and security zones are highly controversial and moreover 
constitute the assertion of rights generically different from the other four 
types of zones. Their omission makes it possible for a state to improve 
effective customs, fiscal, sanitary, or immigration regulations. A state ob-
jecting to these limited types of regulation would not only be flying in 
the face of settled state practice strongly indorsed by the draft convention, 
but would appear to be advocating the existence of a right to smuggle, 
to pollute the sea, or to enter another country illegally. Inclusion of security 
and fishing zones in the convention would actually weaken the position of 
states claiming these traditional rights, for such a convention would serve 
only to unhinge settled principles. Intermixed with the sound policy of 
permitting nations to exclude or prohibit injurious articles or practices 
would be dubious assertions of novel defense and property rights. Instead 
of codifying and clarifying accepted rules, the convention would thus open 
the door to argument over the meaning of sovereignty and the scope of 
freedom of the seas. Security and fishing, in marginal sea areas should be 
the subject of international negotiation, but they should be covered in 
separate agreements, independent of the Geneva Conference draft con-
vention. 
Contiguous zones are a practical method of protecting national interests 
only in specific areas, but they are coming to have a fixed and meaningful 
content. It must be recognized, however, that the whole notion of zones of 
limited competence lying outside territorial waters may be denied any future 
importance. If the present-day expansion of the width of territorial waters 
continues until the largest area of marginal waters that could reasonably 
be subjected to the control of littoral states is encompassed, states bordering 
the sea would then exercise the full complement of powers attendant upon 
sovereignty, and there would be no need for zones of limited competence. 
Thus, the ultimate role of contiguous zones will remain undefined so long 
as the question of the permissible width of territorial waters is unsettled. 
In the meantime, despite the Geneva Conferences, state practice regarding 
contiguous zones will continue to follow the pattern of the past. 
Lloyd C. Fell 
